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1  INTRODUCTION  
Public international lawyers struggle with the concept of an ´international legal order´ 
since more than two hundred years. If we speak of a body of law called ´public interna-
tional law´, we assume that a kind of legal order exists that organizes the international 
community. But how does this legal order look like – and how can we conceptualize the 
underlying international community and the legal order organizing it? These questions 
always had to remain open to a large degree. Conceptualizing the international legal 
order in purely normativist terms proved to be a problemativc enterprise. The idea of a 
´global legal order´ depends on a number of assumptions on how the international 
community functions and how the legal order underpinning it is organized – assump-
tions that are not strictly of legal character. „Theorising the Global Legal Order“ thus is 
an ambitious enterprise going beyond the limits of traditional normativist attempts at 
constructing legal rules and institutions.  
The best a lawyer could do in the traditional continental European tradition of ´legal 
positivism´ would be trying to develop a ´holistic´ model of a ´global legal order´ from 
an internal, normativist perspective. The ´neo-Kantian´ model of the leading German 
school, starting from an assumption of a universal ´international community´1 - with 
international law as the legal order of such community – could offer a suitable theoreti-
cal tool for such an enterprise.2 Even when having strong sympathies for such a theoret-
ical model, however, sympathies nourished by academic descendancy and biography, 
one should abstain from going that path. A good reason for that abstention should be the 
intuition that some essential issues would remain out of sight when taking a purely 
normativist perspective. Seriously theorising the ´global legal order´ is not possible 
without reflecting on the place of law in the global order, in the ´community´ of states. 
Reflecting on the place (and role) of law in the global order, however, requires some 
model of how the ´global order´ looks like and what role international law might play in 
such order.  
The following reflections attempt to go along this way  - they try to analyze the 
´global legal order´ from a perspective inspired by social science theory, theoretical bits 
and pieces mainly borrowed from institutionalism and social constructivism. These ref-
lections cannot give a broad and comprehensive overview of all strands of the theoreti-
cal debate on ´global order´ and how to theorize such global order. The perspective of 
the essay is in essence a legal one – the reflections try to model the ´legal oder´ of the 
                                                 
1  See only Andreas L. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht (München: C.H. Beck, 2001). 
2  See as the seminal masterpiece of this theoretical school Christian Tomuschat, ´International Law: Ensuring the 
Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century´, (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours 9 
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global community, but they try do do that under taking recourse to social science theo-
ries. Inevitably, such a piece of work transgressing the boundaries of academic discip-
lines will bear to a certain degree the traits of ecclecticism. It will single out the parts 
and parcels of social science theory that seem to fit to legal conceptualizations of the 
´global legal order´. The paper will thus have an inbuilt bias towards liberal and con-
structivist theories of global order – simply because such theories fit better to legal con-
cepts of an international legal community than neo-realist or Marxist theories that deny 
the self-rationality of legal discourse. The paper will try to demonstrate that lawyers can 
learn a lot by taking recourse to cerain types of social science models of ´global order´. 
As stressed above, however, the analytical perspective is not a social science perspec-
tive in  itself, but a legal perspective trying to enlighten the theoretical approaches of 
international legal doctrine.  
2 MODELS OF GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER: METHODOLOGICAL 
REFLECTIONS  
When looking around where a suitable model of global order informing lawyers on how 
to conceptualize the ´global legal order´ might come from, unavoidably one ends up 
with international relations theory. However, there is not one IR theory, but a whole 
range of such theories.3 Where should we look for help? The choice, I think, is not that 
difficult for an international lawyer, in particular for one with a neo-Kantian back-
ground. Old-fashioned ´neo-realism´4 has not much to offer for him, since international 
law has not a real place in ´neo-realist´ models of global order, in their perspective is 
not more than a rhetorical device in masquerading the results of power politics. Other 
approaches attract more attention. As a liberal universalist, one is immediately driven to 
´institutionalism´. Scholarship in public international law – thus ist he argument of the 
paper - could profit a lot from linking up systematically with institutionalist strands of 
                                                 
3   See only Beate Jahn (ed.), Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2006); Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2nd ed. 
2005); Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Ian 
Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); Michael W. 
Doyle/G. John Ikenberry (eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 
1997); Andrew P. Dunne, International Theory: To the Brink and Beyond (Westport, Connn.: Greenwood Press, 
1996); Ken Booth (ed.), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); James Der 
Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995). 
4   See only Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1954). 
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international relations theory.5 Legal scholarship must necessarily rely on theoretical 
assumptions (and empirical knowledge) that legal work alone cannot provide.6 But how 
can it be avoided that lawyers intuitively rely on their own ´social constructions of reali-
ty´, their own everyday knowledge of the workings of the international system, thus 
becoming victims of the epistemic trap of unreflected prejudices? Institutionalist models 
of international relations may deliver a suitable framework for critically reconstructing 
the underlying theoretical models and assumptions of the international order, for analyz-
ing the workings of the international legal system that interests most lawyers.7 This is 
not a new insight.8 Most international lawyers will share the assessment that integrating 
international relations (IR) and international law (IL) „can make“ – to cite a famous 
formula of Anne-Marie Slaughter – „international lawyers better lawyers“.9 The diverse 
theoretical perspectives of IR help lawyers to recognize the (often unspoken) assump-
tions that underlie their own and others´ legal arguments, readings of texts and doc-
trines.10   
2.1 Rational Choice Based Paradigms  
Liberal institutionalism is based on rational choice paradigms, while recognizing that 
states (and national interest) are legal fictions that must be set into context by incorpo-
rating international institutions and non-state actors into the framework of analysis.11 
                                                 
5   See Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., ´International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship´ (1998) 92 Am. J. Int´l. L. 367. 
6   From the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics see Friedrich Müller, Juristische Methodik 162 et seq. (Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot, 6th ed. 1995). 
7  Kenneth W. Abbott, ´Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy´ (2006) 1 J. of Int´l. L. & 
Int´l. Relations 9. 
8   See Kenneth W. Abbott, ´Elements of a Joint Discipline´ (1992) 86 Am. Society of Int´l. L. Proceedings 167; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., ´International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Inter-
disciplinary Scholarship´ (1998) 92 Am. J. Int´l. L. 367; see also Kenneth W. Abbot, ´International Relations 
Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts´ (1999) 93 Am. J. Int´l. L. 
361; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ´International Law and International Relations´, (2000) 285 Recueil des Cours 12; 
Kenneth W. Abbott, ´Towards a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy´ (2006) 1 J. of Int´l.L. 
& Int´l. Relations 9. 
9  Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., ´International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Inter-
disciplinary Scholarship´ (1998) 92 AJIL 367. 
10   Id. 
11  See Peter A. Hall/Rosemary C.R. Taylor, ´Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms´(1996) 44 Pol. 
Stud. 936; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, ´International Law in a World of Liberal States´ (1995) 6 Eur. J. Int´l. 
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The relevance of the state as central actor becomes relativized, with individuals, busi-
ness firms, NGOs and other non-state actors entering the scene as more or less equally 
important actors. Collective preferences (the traditional ´national interest´) are modelled 
here as depending not primarily on objective conditions but on demands of private ac-
tors on the national plane. States in this perspective tend to become collective agents 
that further the aggregate interests of their members.12 The ´black box´ of the state is 
opened in these analytical models, which enables scholars to focus on the relevance of 
internal governance structures for international relations, on the input factors influen-
cing the actions of government officials and agencies and on the importance of agency-
driven cooperation below the level of formal diplomacy, and (in general) on the interac-
tion between domestic and international politics.13 Informal cooperation structures 
beyond traditional forms of diplomacy and activities of non-state actors across states 
and in international fora14 are discovered in liberal institutionalism as important forces 
shaping as much the workings of international politics as traditional inter-state relations 
and power struggles determined by ´objective´ state-interests that tended to dominate 
classical ´realist´ models of international relations.15   
The state thus tends to loose his central role in the analysis of the global order, al-
though it is beyond doubt that the state (respectively its various organs, agencies and all 
the actors dependent on it) continue to be a decisive category.16 The focus of analysis 
shifts, however, away from a fictitious collective actor called ´the state´ towards deci-
sion-making at the level of individual actors. The analytical perspective thus shifts to a 
                                                                                                                                               
L. 503, and Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal International Relations Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Weatherhead Center 
for International Affairs Working Paper Series 01/2, 2001). 
12  See Andrew Moravcsik, ´Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics´ (1997) 51 
Int´l. Org. 513. 
13   See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004). 
14  As to the growing interest in the changing role of international NGOs see only Thomas Risse, ´Transnational 
Actors and World Politics´, in: Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds.), Hndbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 
2002), at 255; Richard Price, ´Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics´ (2003) 55 World Pol. 
579; A. Claire Cutler et al. (eds.), Private Authority and International Politics (Albany, N.Y.: State University of 
New York Press, 1999); Margaret E. Keck/Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in In-
ternational Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998). 
15  See only Robert O. Keohane/Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1977); Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, 
Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambrige: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995). 
16   See only Allen Buchanan, ´Rawls´Law of Peoples: Ruzles for a Vanished Westphalian World´, (2000) 110 Ethics 
697. 
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level where it is near to the perspective of legal analysis - a kind of analysis focusing on 
the normative constraints of decision-making.  
2.2 Constructivist Paradigms  
The convergence towards the perspective of classical legal research is even stronger if 
one integrates elements of ´social constructivism´ into the arsenal of analytical tools.17 
The idea of legal constraints is easily reconcilable with a ´constructivist´ analysis of 
´cognitive patterns´, of the factors determining the intellectual landscapes that shape 
decision-making. It is to be admitted, constructivist models do not that easily merge 
with rationalist schools of thought like institutionalism.18 Not that constructivism denies 
the importance of rational calculus. It simply works with the phenomenon that real life 
patterns of social behaviour are not clinically rational, but that the rationality of real life 
actors is to a large degree dominated by context specific ´social constructions of reality´, 
by cognitive patterns that give the rationalities of different actors a very distinct shape.19 
Such ideational strcutures of ´meaning and social value´, which may find its expression 
in particular social constructs of a given ´national interest´ or group interest, are identi-
fied as being prior to individual actors or ´agents´ and the rational calculations that these 
employ in order to pursue certain objectives.20 The ´anarchical society of states´ in this 
view is not an ´objective´ phenomenon as such, but a meaning structure governing the 
relations of states that is intersubjectively construed and learned – and that could be 
modified by creating new understandings.21 To perceive state agents as rational actors 
pursuing a mere means-ends rationality seems – in the eyes of constructivist scholars – 
to be a self-delusion; actors, even when acting as agents of states, are driven primarily 
by their inclination to behave in conformity with the identities, values and norms to 
                                                 
17   This argument was made earlier (and more in detail) by me in Stefan Oeter, ´Toward a Richer Institutionalism in 
International Law and Policy´ (2008) No.1 Univ. of Illininois Law Rev. 61 at 64-68. 
18  See James Fearon/Alexander Wendt, ´Rationalism vs. Constructivism: a Skeptical View´, in: Walter Carlsnaes et 
al. (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002, at 52. 
19  See only Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), at 
139-190. 
20  See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996), at 2 
et seq., 14-22. 
21  See Alexander Wendt, ´Anarchy is What States Make of It´ (1992) 46 Int´l. Org. 391; see also Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), at 113-135. 
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which they have been socialized and which they have internalized.22 Primordial driving-
force is less a rational calculus but the push to be consistent with one´s values and iden-
tities – values and identities that find its expression in legal and social norms and orders 
of preferences. Social and legal norms in such a perspective are much more important 
than ´interests´23 - since ´interests´ reflect mostly the values that underlie such norms. 
The dynamic interdependence of ´interests´, values and preferences and legal and social 
norms have become an important focus of constructivist models, in the sense of a dy-
namic construction of identities and preferences the modes of which can be modified 
through social interaction. 
2.3 Rational Choice and Constructivist Paradigms – Mutual Exclusivity 
or Division of Labor?   
The theoretical focus of traditional institutionalist and of constructivist models thus is 
rather different. But is it impossible to combine rationalist models with constructivist 
theories? I think that both currents fit together much better than usually thought. It is 
true that one cannot simply merge both lines of thought in a hybrid theory. But I think 
that both models can coexist in a quite productive division of labour.24 Rationalist mod-
els usually work at a much higher level of abstraction than constructivist studies. 
´Realism´, classical institutionalism, finally all rational choice based theories construe 
patterns of social interactions in terms of typical model interactions.  To a certain de-
gree, these models are necessarily decoupled from specific context, because they are 
oriented towards constructing models of ´decontextualized´ patterns of behaviour. They 
usually do not explain individual, context-specific behaviour, but typical patterns of 
such behaviour. They are helpful for social sciences as well as all forms of behaviour-
oriented disciplines since they help to understand the general patterns of interest and the 
average behavioural routines, irrespective of any individual variation.25 As a lawyer, 
they help to understand why certain institutions of law are necessary in a given social 
set-up, which types of institutional arrangements (and legal rules) a rational actor will 
                                                 
22  See Andrew Hurrell, ´International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach´, in: Robert J. 
Beck et al. (eds.), International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), at 206-24. 
23  See John Gerard Ruggie, ´What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructiv-
ist Challenge´ (1998) 52 Int´l. Org. 855 at 871-74. 
24  In this sense see also Kenneth W. Abbott, ´Towards a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy´ 
(2006) 1 J. of Int´l.L. & Int´l. Relations 9 at 19. 
25  See also Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford: Oxford  Univ. 
Press, 2008). 
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(or should) prefer and which choice we have in designing social institutions, such as 
law. It would be completely misleading, however, if we would use such models as an 
analytical tool to explain specific individual action – they tell us more how law typically 
operates and why people usually obey to the law, without entering always in a calculus 
on probability and gravity of sanctions for the case that they would not obey. They ab-
ide to the law because the law is in the interest of society, and thus also in their personal 
interest as a member of society, in an ´enlightened´, medium- or long-term perspective – 
and they often have internalized that kind of societal calculus and simply perceive a 
certain law as ´necessary´ and thus binding.26 
If we want to explain why specific actors (or specific groups of actors) act in a spe-
cific way, support specific legal rules (or try to evade them), make use of certain ar-
rangements, and not of others, a constructivist model is much more helpful than an ab-
stract ´rational choice´ model.27 In particular compliance with international norms defi-
nitively involves both instrumental choice and social learning, and argues in favour of a 
synthetic approach to compliance that emphasizes ´argumentative persuasion´, a process 
that involves actors and institutions but takes seriously the possibility of preference 
change through deliberation and social interaction.28 This means, if we want to come to 
a context-specific model explaining why a treaty was concluded in a very specific form 
and later implemented, or why actor X expresses one type of ´opinio juris´ and follows 
one pattern of practice, while another actor Y adheres to another ´opinio juris´ and pre-
fers another ´consuetudo´, we must look to constructivist models.29 ´Rationality´ of in-
dividual actors is – as was already stressed – characterized by specific modes of ´social 
construction of reality´, specific ´cognitive patterns´, and cannot be analyzed without 
paying attention to these specific factors – factors which might be phrased also as ex-
pressions of ´bounded rationality´ in the terminology of New Institutional Economics.30 
                                                 
26  On conceptions of legitimacy, that often include factors of socialization, see Morris Zelditch, ´Theories of Le-
gitimacy´, in: John T. Jost/Brenda Major (eds.), The Psychology of Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2001). 
27  See also Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), at 
113-138. 
28  See only Jeffrey T. Checkel, ´Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change´ (2001) 55 Int´l. Org. 
553, at 581. 
29  I have made a comparable argument form a perspective of systems theory already some years ago – see Stefan 
Oeter, ´International Law and General Systems Theory´, (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 72. 
30   On the concept of ´bounded rationality´ see only Herbert A. Simon, ´Bounded Rationality´, in: John Eatwell et al. 
(eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan 1987), 266-68; Thomas J. Sar-
gent, Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Herbert A. Simon, Models of 
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2.4 Law as a Discursive Process  
Thus, I think, you need both strands of theory in order to analyze adequately complex 
institutional arrangements. It doesn´t even play such a role whether the interactions and 
institutional arrangements are open to an analysis at the level of individual actors.  
Prominent advocates of institutionalism claim that an „enriched institutionalism should 
remain fundamentally actor-centered and purposive in orientation.“31 I do not see the 
necessity why the analytical tool should be limited so much in its reach. Taking into 
consideration the complexities of the process which finally leads to grand institutional 
arrangements, are we not more in a category of social evolution than of ´actor-centered 
purposive interactions´? A good example for that observation is delivered by customary 
international law. The setting of a specific corner-stone, in the sense of a decision to opt 
for a specific expression of opinio juris, may be a purposive action. The discursive 
process, however, of which each individual expression of opinio juris is a part and par-
cel, cannot be modelled suitably in terms of an actor-centered, purposive creation. The 
resulting rules of customary law are the product of complex and protracted discursive 
processes, the result of which is difficult to foresee for each individual actor.32 It may be 
easy – at least in certain cases – to explain the behaviour of individual actors, its opting 
for specific forms of opinio juris, in terms of rational choice. Preferences for certain 
legal positions often will be closely interlinked with interests and incentive-structures, 
will reflect a utility calculus. Even this must not always be the case – not that rarely 
actors will simply opt for a specific opinio juris because they have internalized certain 
norms and values and simply think that practice must conform to these norms and val-
ues. But such actor-specific behaviour is suited, at least in principle, to rational choice-
type explanations.33 The interaction between individual expressions of opinio juris and 
the discursive process that results from such interaction, however, belongs to a different 
category.34 As Kenneth Abbott formulated, „actors are motivated not only by self-
                                                                                                                                               
Bounded Rationality Vol.3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Ru-
dolf Richter/Eirik Furubotn, Neue Institutionenökonomik (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1999), at 4/5; 
Bryan D. Jones, Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and Governance (Chicago: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 2001); Gerd Gigerenzer/Reinhard Selten (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002); Paul Bourgine et al. (eds.), Cognitive Economics (Berlin: Springer, 2004). 
31   Abbott (footn. 24), at 28. 
32   See only the seminal work of Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules. International Relations and 
Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996). 
33  See also Jack L. Goldsmith/Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 
at 23 et seq. 
34  See Oeter (footn. 29), at 87-93. 
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interest, but also by values and principled beliefs. They pursue law through normative 
persuasion, rational argument and bargaining, depending on the audiences they address. 
They view law both as an instantiation of values and norms and as an instrumental 
tool.“35 Such ambivalence is definitely visible with the customary law process, where 
normative beliefs still play an often stronger role than mere instrumental calculations. 
Framing positions in opinio juris language forces actors to argue primarily in terms of 
normative beliefs and values, and not in terms of interests. Such ´encoding´ may first 
serve as an instrumental tool, but it develops its own dynamic and shifts the entire dis-
cursive process.36 Interests are, in the course of this process, not only translated in terms 
of normative beliefs, but to a certain degree also transcended in norms and values. 
Nevertheless, even such institutions might still be analyzed in rational choice terms, 
although the actor-specific interactions upon which they are based will need an analysis 
in constructivist terms, since normative beliefs and values tend to dominate the discur-
sive process led in legal code. Actors largely lose control of the side-effects when ex-
posing to such processes of ´translation´ - with the ensuing results perceived as 
´unintended side-effects´. A comparable process of loss of discursive control may also 
happen with treaty regimes, because the complexity of modern treaty regimes makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to foresee and control all the side-effects of certain institu-
tional designs.37 In principle, however, treaty regimes will be perceived by the actors 
concerned much more as ´purposive creations´ than custromary regimes, even if such 
perception may constitute an illusion.  
We also should devote increased attention to actor-centered processes of norm diffu-
sion that unfold before norms have been fully internalized, with the ensuing phenomena 
of ´strategic social construction´, where persuasion, socialization and internalization 
play at least as much a role as coercion in the form of shaming and political pressure.38 
The crucial role of persuasion, socialization and internalization in the operation of the 
law is undeniable and appeals to the intuition of every lawyer – an intuition which is 
nourished by experience.39 Without these mechanisms, law simply could not operate – 
                                                 
35   Abbott (footn. 24), at 27. 
36  Id., at 92. 
37   See also Harald Müller, ´Arguing, Bargaining and All That Communicative Action. Rationalist Theory and the 
Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations´, (2004) 10 European J. of Int´l. Relations 395. 
38   On internalization as a crucial part of norm-creation and diffusion, see Harold Hongju Koh, ´Why Do Nations 
Obey?´(1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2599, and the same, ´Bringing International Law Home´ (1998) 35 Houston L. Rev. 
623. 
39  See also the abounding literature on ´epistemic communities´ - comp. e.g. Peter Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, 
and International Policy Coordination (special issue) (1992) 46 Int´l. Org.. 
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coercion is too cumbersome and costly to be applied in daily routine. Socialization and 
internalization stabilize an institutional arrangement that often will be favourable in 
macroeconomic terms, because it keeps functioning a certain cluster of interactions 
where transaction costs will be much lower when actors can rely on the expectation that 
future transactions will follow the same pattern as past ones. In terms of individual utili-
ty calculus, loyalty to normative beliefs, based on persuasion, socialization and interna-
lization, might often seem to constitute an expression of ´bounded rationality´40 - but 
perhaps such ´bounded rationality´ preserves an institutionally optimal arrangement that 
puts individual members in a far better position than they would be in a society of radi-
cal benefit maximizers that always end up in opportunism eroding any legal arrange-
ment. 
Coupled to this there is a final point which deserves attention: the competition be-
tween short-term individual (and group) preferences and long-term collective interests.41 
A kind of ´naive´ realism that entrusts definition of collective interests of a nation unre-
servedly to a running administration risks sacrificing long-term interests to short-term 
interests of specific political elite groups. We know from Public Choice scholarship that 
politics at national as well as international level is caught in immense ´Principal-Agent´ 
problems.42 Tying the hands of political elites in favor of certain long-term interests of 
societies, be it by constitutional arrangements or by international legal arrangements, 
makes a lot of sense under this perspective. The wish to be re-elected is a legitimate 
concern for a leadership in a democracy, and thus also the need to mobilize support, to 
serve crucial lobbies, to pursue certain ideological objectives. But the space given to 
these concerns must be limited. A pattern of abiding to the law because it is a law may 
be very efficient in economic terms, saves a lot of transaction costs – because it avoids 
the trap of opening up a sheer endless discourse of what are the ´real´ interests of a na-
tion, and not only the short-term preferences of a specific administration. In this sense, a 
crude form of traditional ´realism´ may resemble in reality more a phenomenon of 
´bounded rationality´ than constitute an enlightened rational calculus. The intuition of 
most professionals of international law revolts against radical kinds of rationalist argu-
ments in terms of a blunt ´realism´ (like that of Goldstein and Posner43) – and an in-
                                                 
40  See supra footn. 30. 
41  See on the issue of long-term collective interests and the way how they can best  be pursued only the collective 
volumes edited by Inge Kaul et al. (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); Inge Kaul et al. (eds.), Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Global-
ization (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003). 
42   See only Dennis C. Mueller, Publlic Choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), at 359-385. 
43   Jack L. Goldsmith/Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005). 
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depth analysis of the time aspects of rational choice, of the pay-offs of present non-
compliance and future gains of compliance, might prove this intuition to be right. Inter-
national law is to a large degree a mechanism to ensure consistent policies over time, 
despite all the volatilities of national politics and the constant shifts of short-term prefe-
rences. 
The combination of an institutionalist model with a complementary ´constructivist´ 
perspective on the dynamic interdependence of ´interests´, values and preferences and 
legal and social norms, as a determinant of decisional behaviour at the level of specific 
actors, has certain parallels in other models. The most prominent model with resembling 
features is the  model of ´actor-centered institutionalism´ developed by Fritz Scharpf44 . 
3 WHY DO WE NEED INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
What does all this meta-discourse on methodological approaches mean for the enter-
prise of ´theorising the global legal order´? This paper admittedly must give an answer 
to this question. But the question of underlying theoretical approaches is intimately 
linked with another basic question that has puzzled international relations specialists 
and international lawyers for decades: Why do we need a body of legal rules governing 
the relations of states, a body of rules we call international law? Traditional legal posi-
tivism cannot give us the answer to this problem, since it does not question the necessity 
and the binding force of of such body of legal rules, but rests on the (seemingly iron) 
assumption that such rules are needed and that they exerce binding force.45 We must 
come back to institutionalism here. One of the major contributions of institutionalism to 
the discussions taken up here was to show how states could productively cooperate in 
the absence of a centralized law-maker or law enforcer.46 States, economies and socie-
ties are more and more interdependent, which means that there is an ever-growing de-
mand of coordination and cooperation between states and societal actors in general. 
Without coordination and cooperation, most sectors of economic and societal activity 
could not function efficiently any more. Even national politics today needs the coopera-
tion of other states in order to achieve the proclaimed objectives in most fields of politi-
cal action.  
Institutionalist writings on problems of ´collective action´ can tell us a lot on the log-
ic why states enter into international legal obligations and create complex international 
                                                 
44   See Fritz Scharpf, Interaktionsformen. Akteurzentrierter Institutionalismus in der Politikforschung (Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich, 2000). 
45   See also Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press 2008). 
46  See Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 16. 
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´regimes´. To summarize it very briefly at the outset: Collective interests, the need to 
secure the provision of collective goods and the broad range of various types of coordi-
nation problems force states compellingly to cooperate with one another. If states want 
to avoid jurisdictional and other conflicts that might cost at the end a lot of political 
energy (and transaction costs), not to speak of damages caused by fighting through in-
ter-state conflicts, they must develop institutionalized mechanisms of coordination. As 
Posner and Goldstein summarize it: “In cases of coordination, states receive higher 
payoffs if they engage in identical or symmetrical actions than if they do not.”47 Identic-
al or symmetrical action does not come from alone, however, but needs specific ar-
rangements coordinating collective action. Game theory shows us that such collective 
action, if not coordinated, might end up in dilemma type situations.48 In order to avoid 
such dilemma-type situations, institutionalized arrangements are often necessary, ar-
rangements that tell the actors involved how to behave if the intended coordination shall 
be achieved. The major instrument of such institutionalization always has been interna-
tional law, although there may be also more informal modes of institutionalizing certain 
coordination arrangements. The whole range of literature on transnational administra-
tive networks gives proof to the fact that such informal modes of cooperation play an 
ever growing role in relations beyond frontiers. 
Beyond mere coordination, joint and concerted action in pursuit of a common objec-
tive might be feasible. Such deepened cooperation might lead to considerable gains. But 
again stable modes of interaction are needed to enable efficient cooperation – modes of 
interaction that might need a strong degree of institutionalization in a legal regime. The 
intended common objectives might be objectives which are in the interest of two or 
three states, but might also be specific interests from which the whole community of 
states might profit.49 Climate policy is a good example of the last sort of collective inter-
est – all states suffer, although to different degrees, if climate change goes on without 
any alteration. Framing climate change would be a collective interest of all states, a 
´common interest of mankind´.  Such a ´collective good´, however, is often difficult to 
achieve. Positive and negative externalities will create rather divergent incentives to 
cooperate for states as well as political and societal actors inside states. Some states 
might be tempted to profit from the costly endeavours of the others as a ´free-rider´. 
Others will enter into cooperation arrangements but later might fall into opportunistic 
behaviour and desert from the required mode of interaction.  
                                                 
47  Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 12. 
48  See Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 32-35. 
49  On the concept of ´community interests´ of the international community see Paulus (footn. 1), at 250 et seq. 
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It is evident that such complex cooperation games need institutionalized arrange-
ments if cooperation shall really work. Customary law usually will not suffice here to 
secure the necessary degree of cooperation.50 Much more differentiated treaty regimes 
will be needed – treaty regimes which include mechanisms that ensure a certain transpa-
rency of how states behave under the agreed body of rules and mechanisms of com-
pliance management creating specific incentives (positive or negative) to remain loyal 
to the undertakings entered into under the regime. There is an interesting body of litera-
ture linking international law with rational choice based institutionalist models, and 
with game theory in particular, that has tried to analyze these complex arrangements of 
compliance management characteristic for modern treaty regimes.51   
Another prominent line of research shows us that coordination must not necessarily 
happen in legal forms, but often takes place in informal networks.52 An interesting fol-
low-up enterprise would be to model the underlying dilemma-type situations of 
´collective action´, in order to find out in which cases states take recourse to the forms 
and institutions of international law, create formal bodies of legal rules, so-called ´treaty 
regimes´, and institutionalize existing or newly founded networks (or clusters of net-
works) in an international organization, and in which cases they stick to forms of infor-
mal coordination operating through networks that deliberately lack any legal institutio-
nalization. 
4 THE FRAGMENTED NATURE OF GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 
The overall legal order resulting from such a structure is a rather fragmented enterprise. 
The individual treaty regimes are not the result of a coordinated, planned effort, but are 
products of a very decentralized arrangement. The basic characteristic of the ´global 
legal order´ formed out of such networks and regimes is its manifold and fragmented 
nature. Specialized networks and regimes organize specific bureaucratic and/or expert 
communities, link together actors from the public (i.e.state) side as well as actors from 
civil society and the business world. The networks formed between them, irrespectively 
whether they are networks of public agencies and bureaucracies or networks of business 
firms and civil society organisations, do not differ that much in substance. Bureaucratic 
networks depend on the personal and institutional influence of its members as much as 
societal networks. Transnational coordination does not necessarily involve the state – 
                                                 
50  See Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 37/38. 
51  See in particular Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with Interna-
tional Regulatory Regimes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995); see also Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 
43), at 84-91. 
52  See only Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 91 et seq. 
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just to the contrary, research on transnational norm-building networks has shown that 
private actors from business and the world of NGO´s can effectively coordinate patterns 
of interaction without any state involvement.53 Sometimes cooperation with public bod-
ies and bureaucracies is needed, but often civil society can act on its own by construct-
ing specific networks.  
And even if public bodies are involved, it is usually not the state as such, understood 
in a traditional sense as a unitary collective actor, that  is concluding and operating the 
hundreds of specific treaty regimes, but the specific bureaucracies and agencies that are 
entrusted with pursuing certain specialized policy objectives.  
4.1 Phenomena of Fragmentation  
Fundamental for understanding the fragmented nature of global legal order is a step 
which has been called the ´piercing of the veil´ of unitary statehood. 54 The traditional 
way how international relations tried to understand the ´global order´ - as product of a 
set of unitary actors, namely states - hinders an adequate conceptualizion of the current 
global legal order. The state as a unitary collective actor is a fiction.55 States do not act 
with one voice in the international arena. Depending on the specific issue and the rele-
vant forum, it is usually a small number of specialized organs and agencies that act vis-
à-vis their foreign counterparts. With other words: Traditional ´international´ relations 
through the classical diplomatic channels nowadays are only a small part and parcel of 
interactions between states and the governmental systems.56 The major part consists of 
so-called ´transgovernmental´ activities, “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the 
cabinets or chief executives of these governments”.57 These ´sectorial´ networks 
represent the plurality of legal subsystems, each of which is trying to stabilize a specific 
social system.58  
                                                 
53  See the recent survey of the relevant debate by Gralf-Peter Calliess and Moritz Renner, ´Transnationalizing Pri-
vate Law – The Public and the Private Diemnsions of Transnational Commercial Law´, (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal 1341-1355, accessible via Internet under http://www.germanlawjournal.com. 
54  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004), at 12 et seq. 
55  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 12. 
56  See only Slaughter (footn. 53), at 10-11, 36-64. 
57  Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ´Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations´, 
(1974) 27 World Politics 39, at 43. 
58  See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ´Fragmentierung des Weltrechts: Vernetzung gloabler Re-
gimes statt etatistischer Rechtseinheit´, in: Matthias Albert and Rudolf Stichweh (eds.), Weltstaat und Weltstaat-
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The institutional arrangements entrusted with the task of creating some kind of con-
sistent voice to the outside world are relatively weak and have proven to be not really 
capable to achieve the objective of preserving the ´unity´ of the state as an outside actor. 
In institutional and procedural terms, it is mostly not the Foreign Office and the diplo-
matic apparatus that is sending out its emissaries in order to negotiate on a new regime, 
but this is usually done on the initiative and under the direction of the responsible sec-
torial ministry and/or agency that harbours the relevant expert know-how on the specific 
issue.59 If an environmental problem is to be solved, it is the Ministry of the Environ-
ment that is negotiating and concluding the agreement. If it is an issue of economic pol-
icy, it is the Ministry of the Economy, and accordingly it is in the other cases. Admitted-
ly, the Foreign Ministries are still informed and participate in negotiations, but not as 
the leaders and with an exclusive role in outside relations, more with a coordinatory 
function.  
Thus the responsibles in terms of international policies are the issue-specific expert 
communities. Most policy sectors and sub-sectors have its own expert communities 
forming a kind of separate ´epistemic community´.60 The orientations, modes of profes-
sional socialization and ´cognitive patterns´ of national bureaucrats and experts resem-
ble each other very much in such ´epistemic communities´ – much more than between 
ministries in the same governmental structure. In such ´epistemic communities´, mem-
bers find it much easier negotiating with their counterparts in other states than coordi-
nating their policies internally with neighboring ministries. Such plurality of actors and 
sub-systems reflects in its modes of operation the need to respect the rationality of the 
social operations of different social systems – social systems the stability of which the 
various legal sub-systems have to guarantee.61 
4.2 ´Disaggregating the State´ as an Analytical Requirement   
It is accordingly necessary to engage in an effort of analytically “disaggregating the 
state”, as Anne-Marie Slaughter formulated it62. This means in an analytical perspective 
dissecting the state into its parts and parcels, into the myriads of special bureaucracies, 
                                                                                                                                               
lichkeit. Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 
2007), at 37. 
59  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 41-64. 
60  As to the concept of ´epistemic communities´ see only Peter Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International 
Policy Coordination (special issue) (1992) 46 Int´l. Org.. 
61   See Gunther Teubner, ´Des Königs viele Leiber: Die Selbstdekonstruktion der Hierarchie des Rechts, in: Hauke 
Brunkhorst and Matthias Kettner (eds.), Globalisierung und Demokratie (Frakfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2000), at 240.  
62  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 12 et seq. 
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agencies, regulators and individual actors forming the cluster of public authorities that 
we usually call the state. The traditional idea that all these actors operate in such coordi-
nation that we can deal with them as a kind of single, unfied collective actor has proven 
to be mere fiction. The different bureaucracies and agencies represent different interests 
and are interwoven with different sectors of society.63 Their specific construction of the 
´common good´ usually incorporates sector-specific interests of their societal partner 
organizations and groups, represents sectorial interests of a client network. In interact-
ing directly with their foreign counterparts in the governmental bureaucracies of other 
states, they form powerful networks that are able to pursue such specific interests also 
on an international level, in a transnational (or ´transgovernmental´) mode of interac-
tion. The resultant shift from government to governance marks “a significant erosion of 
the boundaries separating what lies inside a government and its administration and what 
lies outside them.”64 The consequence “is to advantage ´experts and enthusiasts´, the 
two groups outside government that have the greatest incentive and desire to participate 
in governance processes”.65 With that in-built bias in ´transnational governance´, how-
ever, we will encounter a serious problem. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has put it: The 
various governmental actors “can and should interact with a wide range of non-
governmental organizations (NGO´s), but their role in governance bears distinct and 
different responsibilities. They must represent all their different constituencies, at least 
in a democracy; corporate and civic actors may be driven by profits and passions, re-
spectively. ´Governance´ must not become a cover for the blurring of these lines, even if 
it is both possible and necessary for these various actors to work together on common 
problems.”66  
The cited passage from Anne-Marie Slaughter´s “New World Order” highlights sev-
eral issues that are of utmost importance for the current global legal order and its further 
development.  
- Firstly, the growing role of transnationally operating corporate and civil society ac-
tors, mostly in the form of transnational enterprises and international NGO´s.67 These 
                                                 
63  See only Benner/Obser/Reinicke/Witte, ´Global Public Policy: Chancen und Herausforderungen vernetzten Re-
gierens´, (2001) Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 359 et seq. 
64  Martin Shapiro, ´Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance´, (2001) 8 Indi-
ana J. of Global Legal Studies, 369, at 369. 
65  Slaughter (footn. 53), at 9-10. 
66  Slaughter (footn. 53), at 10. 
67  As to the growing importance of these non-governmental actors see Ghils, ´International Civil Society: Interna-
tional Non-Governmental Organizations in the Internationnal System´, (1992) 44 Int´l. Social Science J. 417 et 
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non-governmental actors operate on their own terms on a transnational plane and have 
begun already a long time ago to create their own body of rules and institutions.68 The 
networks created and operated by these societal actors have proven to be rather success-
ful in a whole range of issues. Not only supply-chain networks and their normative 
complementary, the institutionalization of ´corporate social responsibilty´ via agree-
ments inside such networks, have become a success story that influences the world as 
much as governmental action does. Also a variety of other networks and transnational 
rule-making operated by non-state actors has started to frame decisively our global or-
der.69  
- Secondly, the blurring line between these actors and governmental actors deserves 
utmost attention. Specific bureaucracies and agencies are not only closely interwoven 
with these corporate and civic actors, strongly influenced by them in gathering informa-
tion and also in constructing their specific perspective of the ´common good´, but are 
also to a growing degree coalescing with these actors, closely coordinating activites up 
to advanced forms of cooperation in order to pursue common objectives.  
Thus, specialized bureaucracies and agencies often form coalitions with corporate 
and civic actors from the same sector, as well as with its partner buireaucracies and 
agencies from other states, in order to overcome opposition from other government ac-
tors in their own governmental system. Transgovernmental networks, but also interna-
tional regimes and international organizations resulting from such regimes, may serve 
as organizational tools in such campaigns and turf warfare against other sectors of gov-
ernment.  
4.3 Consequences for Law-Making in the Global Legal Order  
The repercussions on international law-making are manifold. But there is one primordi-
al result: Institutional fragmentation mirrors in fragmentation of international law-
                                                                                                                                               
seq.; Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law (Berlin. Duncker & Humblot 
1999); Higgott (ed.), Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System (London and New York, 2000). 
68  See de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition 
(After the Law), (Routledge, 1995); Gunther Teubner, ´´Global Bukowina´. Legal Pluralism in the World Soci-
ety´, in: Gunther Teubner, Global Law Without a State (Aldershot, 1997), at 3 et seq.; Haufler, A Public Role for 
the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy (Washington, 2001). 
69  See onlythe overview given by Peer Zumbansen, ´Transnational Law´, in: Jan M. Smits, ed., Elgar Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law (Cheltenham, 2006), 738 et seq., comp. also Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Au-
thority. Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge, 2003), as well as Robert Wai, 
´Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society´, (2006) 46 Harvard Int´l. L. J. 
471. 
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making – and a fragmented process of international law-making inevitably leads to a 
fragmented body of innternational legal rules.70 The ´unity´ of international law as a 
legal order in itself is a mere fiction.71 Negotiated in specialized fora by specialized bu-
reaucracies and agencies, international treaties form not a consistent body of rules, but a 
plethora of segmented legal regimes that are based on divergent assumptions and 
´cognitive patterns´, follow different objectives, use different tools and instruments and 
might end up in contradictory provisions.72 If concluded as formal international legal 
treaties with binding force for national legislators, such treaties still need the approval 
of national parliaments. But the procedures of parliamentary approval are not of such a 
nature that they could sort out inconsistencies and contradictions with treaty obligations 
from other sectors. Parliamentarians usually are too ignorant concerning problems of 
international legal order to solve in advance problems of coordination and to prevent 
inconsistencies. Problems of consistency usually come up only at a later stage, in the 
implementation phase, and then it is the task of the implementing agencies and of the 
relevant courts and tribunals to sort out the problems and to attempt to find a solution. 
If such treaties are open to judicial dispute-settlement, it could be the task of interna-
tional courts and tribunals to harmonize the inconsistent undertakings resulting from 
different sectorial treaties.73 But the world of international courts and tribunals again is a 
fragmented world.74 The International Court of Justice is far from having any kind of 
                                                 
70  See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Diffculties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN-Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 of 13 April 2006, available under http://www.helsinki.fi/oik/globalgovernance/ Mallisi-
vusto/tutkimus/L_682_E%5B1%5D.pdf . 
71  See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner,  Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen 
Rechts (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2006), in particular at 25-40; see also Martti Koskenniemi, ´International Law 
and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration´, (2004) 17 Cambridge Rev. Of Int´l. Affairs, at 197.. 
72  Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ´Fragmentation of International Law: Postmodern Anxieties´, (2002) 17 
Leiden J. of Int´l. Law, at 553 et seq.; Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ´Diversity or cacophony? 
New Sources of Norms in International Law´, (2004) 25 Michigan J. of Int´l. Law, at 1059-1073. 
73  See Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Morawcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ´Legalized Dispute Resolution: Inter-
state and Transnational, (2000) 54 International Organization , at 137-180. 
74  See Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford 2003); Patrizia 
Vigni, ´The Overlapping of Dispute Settlement Regimes ´, (2001) 11 Italian Yb. of int´l. Law 139 et seq.; Tho-
mas Buergenthal, ´Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?´, (2001) 14 Leiden J. of 
Int´l. Law 267 et seq.; Vaughan Lowe, ´Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals´, (1999) 20 Australian 
Yb. of int´l. Law 191 et seq.; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ´The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the Interna-
tional Legal System and the International Court of Justice´, (1999) 31 NYU J. of Int´l. Law & Policy 791 et seq.; 
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monopoly over judicial dispute settlement in international law – just to the contrary, its 
ambit of jurisdiction is still relatively limited and insular, and with its current organiza-
tion it would have difficulties of acting seriously as the major ´judicial function´ in the 
global legal order.75 The traditional way out of this dilemma has been the creation of a 
series of new (regime-specific) specialized fora of judicial dispute settlement, specia-
lized fora that can react much more flexibly to the specific requirements of dispute set-
tlement in specific sectorial regimes. In such specialized mechanisms, speedy forms of 
procedure may be created (as in the WTO dispute settlement system), specific technical 
expertise may be taken on board, and the risks entered into by states by subjecting 
themselves to a gouvernement des juges may be limited due to the sectorial limitation of 
acceptance of judicial dispute settlement.76 Result of such ´proliferation´ of judicial dis-
pute-settlement bodies, however, is an obvious fragmentation of judicial dispute settle-
ment – a fragmentation which constitutes the price to be paid for the growth of judicial 
dispute settlement as such.77 There are some mechanisms that help to avoid open con-
flict between various bodies of judicial dispute settlement.78 However, the basic results 
of such trends of fragmentation are obvious: ´judicialization´ is uneven in scope and 
                                                                                                                                               
Jonathan I. Charney, ´The Impact on the Internnational Legal system of the Growth of International Courts and 
Tribunals´, (1999) 31 NYU J. of Int´l. Law & Policy 697 et seq.; Hugh Thirlway, ´The Proliferation of Interna-
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75  See also Judge Shigeru Oda, ´The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. A Myth´, (2000) 
49 ICLQ 251-265. 
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and the WTO´, (2008) 52 International Studies Quarterly 825-854. 
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Problems and Possible Solutions´, (2001) 5 Max Planck Yb. of United Nations Law 67 at 71 et seq.; M.C.W. 
Pinto, ´The Court and Other International Tribunals´, in: Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee (eds.), Increasing the Ef-
fectiveness of the International Court of Justice (The Hague et al. 1997) 281, at 282-284. 
78  See in particular Jonathan I. Charney, ´Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?´, 
(1998) 271 Recueil des Cours 101 et seq; Georges Abi-Saab, ´Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding 
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intensity, and the perspectives and objectives of different dispute settlement bodies vary 
to a great degree.  
5 TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS AND COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
The current global legal order accordingly is characterized by strong features of frag-
mentation, uneven growth and resulting asymmetries. As explained above, this is to a 
large degree result of the complex, organic network character of the global order. Net-
works organize the interactions between state actors and the corporate as well as civic 
actors working on a transnational plane.79 The hundreds, if not thousands of networks of 
transnational as well as transgovernmental character described above serve a whole 
range of functions in the global order.  
Formal law-making at the international level, at least as far as the creation and mod-
ification of treaty regimes is concerned, usually is rather formalized, and is reserved to 
formal institutional fora like international organizations and inter-state conference struc-
tures.80 The results of the cumbersome procedures applied in these fora regularly need 
the approval of national parliaments, which makes such kind of formal law-making 
even more cumbersome. The informal networks and international regimes in which 
states organize the needed coordination and cooperation at agency-level, on the other 
hand, rarely serve the purpose of law-making in itself, at least as far as binding legal 
rules are concerned. This does not exclude altogether standard-setting in such networks 
– but such standard-setting will then lead to standards which in a legal perspective can 
be qualified only as ´soft law´.81 Nevertheless, such informal standards may play an im-
portant role in enabling efficient coordination between state actors, in organizing coop-
eration, may sometimes even serve as an informal tool of harmonization of national 
regulatory standards, as the example of the Basel Committee and the Basel standards for 
banking regulation demonstrate.82 But delegated law-making or standard-setting en-
trusted to specialized networks still remains an exception. In some international organi-
zations, usually of a very technical nature, formal law-making powers delegated to the 
organs of international organisation exist, although to a limited degree.83 In general, 
                                                 
79  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 2 et seq. 
80  See only the chapter on the ´legislative function´ in the global legal order contained in the Hague Academy´s 
general course of Christian Tomuschat, ´International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a 
New Century´, (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours 9 at 305 et seq. 
81  As to the category of ´soft law´ see Tomuschat (footn. 78), at 349 et seq. 
82  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 42-43, 210-220. 
83  See again Tomuschat (footn. 78) at 341-344. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 109) 
- 21 - 
however, formal law-making still is a prerogative of classical diplomatic mechanisms 
involving foreign ministries and national parliaments.  
The task of informal networks and formalized regimes usually is relatively limited. It 
consists of, firstly, the gathering and spreading of information, and secondly, monitor-
ing the implementation of the legal rules agreed upon previously.84  In an institutionalist 
perspective it is the implementation function which is of particular interest – of particu-
lar interest because it sheds light also on the old question how international law works 
in practice, why states obey given rules. A complex set of mechanisms is used here. 
Starting point is an enlightened self-interest of states to achieve a certain coordination 
and cooperation, to solve problems of collective action, to provide collective goods.85 
Peer-group pressure and formal mechanisms of monitoring are often the tools used in 
order to ensure that states follow such enlightened self-interest, even if tempted by po-
litical (short-term) gains that might be reached when defecting from legal standards..86 
There is always a danger of ´opportunistic behaviour´, a danger that relevant actors drop 
out from the required course of action and try to gain advantages as ´free-riders´ from 
the rule obedience of others. Accordingly, safeguards are needed in most international 
regimes in order to induce relevant actors to keep to the rules. 
An institutionalist perspective helps us to understand the specific role of mechanisms 
of compliance control.87 Linking up the international regimes with actors from civil so-
ciety helps to strengthen compliance control and augments political pressure put on 
states to abide by the rules of international law.88 If needed, instruments of ´capacity 
building´ may also be vital tools to ensure loyal implementation of agreed rules – failed 
and/or precarious states often are simply not capable to implement ambitious legal un-
dertakings, even if wanting to do so.89 Not that state actors only comply with interna-
tional legal obligations when they are forced to do so. In most cases, state actors will 
opt for compliance because they have internalized patterns of ´rule of law´ and think 
                                                 
84  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 51-61. 
85  See Chayes/Handler Chayes (footn. 51), at 3 et seq. 
86  See Chayes/Handler Chayes (footn. 51), at 135 et seq., 154 et seq. 
87  See also, in addition to the ground-breaking work of Chayes/Handler Chayes (footn. 51), Goldsmith/Posner 
(footn. 43), at 100 et seq. 
88  See Chayes/Handler Chayes (footn. 51) at 250-270. 
89  See Slaughter (footn. 53), at 57-58; comp. also Stefan Oeter, ´Prekäre Staatlichkeit und die Grenzen internationa-
ler Verrechtlichung´, in: Regina Kreide and Andreas Niederberger (eds.), Transnationale Verrechtlichung, Frank-
furt/New York: Campus, 2008, 90, at 101, 109. 
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that legal obligations should be respected as such.90 In addition, state actors tend to ac-
cumulate ´social capital´ as law-abiding actors – and you do not devaluate such ´social 
capital´ easily.91 ´Reputation´ really matters.92 But behind such behavioural and cogni-
tive factors stand also certain incentive structures. In most cases, it is also a requirement 
of rational behaviour to respect international legal obligations. And institutionalized 
mechanisms of compliance control are instrumental devices to create such incentive 
structures, inducing state actors to take certain legal obligations seriously. Much could 
be said about this issue – Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes have written a 
seminal book of some four hundred pages about the issue, and there is still more to be 
studied. 
6 GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER AND THE CRISIS OF STATEHOOD IN THE 
SOUTH 
There is another issue which we must bear in mind when dealing with the problems of 
global legal order – the crisis of statehood in large parts of the South. Modern statehood 
is a model imposed upon global society by European colonialism – a model which does 
not have strong roots in societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As time goes by, 
the façade of ordered statehood falls apart in one state after the other.93 The remaining 
structures of public authority resemble forms of modern statehood in its external im-
agery – they have a government, a capital, an army and a foreign service. However, all 
the forms of public administration and public services that are typical for modern state-
hood constitue only a kind of ´surface law´94 but do not work sufficiently in order to 
fulfil the functions that modern international law presupposes for its usual mode of 
functioning.95  
                                                 
90  This is neglected by Goldsmith and Posner when they argue that so-called ´noninstrumental reasons´ do not 
provide a good explanation for compliance with international law – see Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 100, 
104-105. 
91  See also Goldsmith/Posner (footn. 43), at 101-104. 
92  See only Guzman (footn. 25), at 71-117. 
93  See only Tobias Debiel and Dieter Reinhardt, Staatsverfall und Weltordnungspolitik. Analytische Zugänge und 
politische Strategien zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, (2004) 18 Nord-Süd aktuell, at 525-538. 
94   See William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008), Chapter 10. 
95  See Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and teh Third World (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990); Marina Ottaway, ´Rebuilding state Institutions in Collapsed States´, in: Jennifer 
Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction (London: Blackwell, 2003), 245-266. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 109) 
- 23 - 
More and more norms of public international law are based upon certain statal infra-
structure at national level.96 The proper functioning of human rights protection presup-
poses a fuctioning judiciary that keeps all the organs of public authority under control 
and imposes sanctions if violations of rights occur.97 Humanitarian law rest on a well-
organised disciplinary and military justice system at national level – and if that is lack-
ing, the military actors on the ground soon start to ignore the relevant rules. WTO law 
requires an extremely elaborate infrastructure of customs and excises adminsitration – 
and if one looks into TRIPS, a highly developped judiciary that grants all the necessary 
possibilities to enforce immaterial property rights at national level. International envi-
ronmental law rests upon the precondition that a state possesses an efficent environmen-
tal administration – or how else do you administer challenging rule systems on climate 
change, water resources management or marine protection. One could prolong that list 
nearly indefinitely. 
What we can draw from these few examples is a simple but brute fact: Large parts of 
modern international law will not work adequately if the necessary administrative and 
judicial infrastructure is lacking that most treaty regimes presuppose in the current sys-
tem of multi-level governance.98 The architecture of global legal order may react in two 
very different ways to these shortcomings. One could, firstly, stick to the challenging 
assumptions on the capacities and capabilities of underlying national statehood – and 
where these preconditions are evidently not met, the community of states could try to 
invest resources into the capacity-building at the level of national administrations and 
judiciaries. To a certain degree such a strategy might work – but this requires that the 
mismatch between implicitly assumed capacities and existing deficiencies is not too 
large. The other avenue would be to lower the level of commitments required from na-
tional governmental systems. Here and there international law already works with such 
strategies – think of WTO´s system of preferential treatment for least-developped coun-
tries that liberates such low-capacity members of the system from the burden of a whole 
series of obligations.  
In the details of regime architecture, international law already takes into considera-
tion the described problems. At a general level, however, the issue is very rarely raised 
as an important point. International law theory must, however, and this is my firm con-
viction, confront the resulting problems very openly and must start a general debate on 
                                                 
96   See the examples given in Stefan Oeter, ´Prekäre Staatlichkeit und die Grenzen internationaler Verrechtlichung´, 
in: Regina Kreide and Andreas Niederberger (eds.), Transnationale Verrechtlichung, Frankfurt and New York: 
Campus, 2008), 90, at 98-105. 
97   See only Twining (footn. 91), Chapter 12. 
98  See more in detail Oeter (footn. 93), at 96 et seq. 
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the topic. What can we expect realistically from the national level in the global system 
of multi-level governance when we are dealing with technical issues implying for its 
implementation a well-functioning administrative and judicial apparatus? A structured 
discussion on the problem has not even started sincerely until now. 
7 LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVITY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 
An issue linked to questions of implementation is the issue of legitimacy and effectivity 
of international legal norms. Procedural aspects play a key role here – procedural fair-
ness in the formation of legal rules is a basic requirement to perceive the relevant obli-
gations as ´legitimate´.99 Such procdural fairness, or ´input legitimacy´, must be seen in 
a close relationship with arguments of ´effectivity´, or ´output legitimacy´. The rele-
vance of both aspects of legitimacy differs according to the special characteristics of the 
different segments of international law. In some areas, international law stresses solely 
the procedural side, whereas in other areas substantial results of the regime are the final 
yardstick.100  
A third issue will be of relevance in a number of cases – the value systems structur-
ing societies and the degree to which norms of international law conform to (and con-
firm) societal value systems. Current debates in legal theory and philosophy stress here 
the differences between communitarian approaches, grounded in an old-European 
´Aristotelianism´, on the one hand, and liberal ´individualism´, as e.g. known from hu-
man rights theory and from ´methodological individualism´ in economic scholarship, on 
the other hand. This is not a mere debate of academic scholars from Europe and other 
OECD-countries.101 The debate on ´Eastern Asian values´, questing for a different inter-
pretation of international human rights instruments, is a telling example of that same 
fundamental debate, as well as the recent discussions on the role of Islamic legal tradi-
tions in conceptualizing international law.102 These discussions remind us that most in-
                                                 
99  See Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1990), and more recently also Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007). 
100  See also Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (Berlin  et al.: Springer, 
2008), in particular the introductory chapters by Rüdiger Wolfrum, ´Legitimacy in International Law from a Le-
gal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations´, ibid., at 1 et seq., and of Allen Buchanan and Robert O. 
Keohane, ´The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions´, ibid., at 25 et seq. 
101  See also H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford: Oxford univ. 
Press 2004). 
102  See only, on the one hand, Yash Ghai, ´Human Rights and Asian Values´, (1998) 9 Public Law Rev. 168, and on 
the other hand Abdullahi An-Naím, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shariá (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Univ. Press 2008). 
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ternational law can serve as a mirror of value conflicts – think of Sharia lawyers resis-
tance towards any form of ´universality´ of some of the concrete human rights guaran-
tees that were embodied in the Universal Declaration of 1948 and in the two UN Cove-
nants.  
Universality of international law, and in particular of human rights, is an ambitious 
normative statement.103 Empirically, such statement of universal validity is wrong, since 
the value system expressed in international human rights convenants is not an expres-
sion of genuinely universal values, but of European values spread over the world in the 
course of the expansion of the European state.104 Nevertheless, in a normative perpec-
tive, ´universality´ serves a noble purpose – reminding states that what they have signed 
and ratified as treaty law, in order to be perceived as a ´civilized state´ in international 
diplomacy, constitutes a binding legal standard for them. But even beyond that purely 
normativist argument, ´universality´ has an important dimension of international legal 
policy. Proclaimed ´universality´ implicitly has an emancipatory function towards tradi-
tional communitarian value systems – non-governmental organizations, opposition 
movements and repressed segments of society can use ´universal´ human rights as a 
basis for their claims of political and social change, can use it as a tool in trying to trans-
form traditional power structures and the inequalities and the repression resulting from 
them.105 ´Universal´ human rights thus have a potential to erode traditional authorities 
and traditional modes of societal organization.106 But that is part of the problem, and the 
reason why the debate on the ´universality´ of international legal norms will go on for 
quite a time. The representatives of traditional society realize just that emancipatory – if 
not to say: revolutionary – potential that is built into ´universal´ human rights and ac-
cordingly try to limit human rights to small legal reserves, if they do not reject the 
whole idea as a Western import designed to ´colonize´ non-European societies in cul-
tural terms. The statement of ´universal´ values of global society thus is not an innocent 
                                                 
103  See Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi: Oxford univ. Press 2nd ed. 2006); Marie-Bénédicte 
Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2006); Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 2006); James 
Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford univ. Press 2008). 
104  See Ram Prakash Anand, Studies in International Law and History (Leiden et al.: Nijhoff, 2004) and Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2005). 
105  See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2006),  
106  See also Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press 2006), at 423. 
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factual statement but a normative claim that has a strong transformative potential if ap-
plied to societies outside Europe.107 
8 CONCLUSIONS: THE ´GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER´ - PROBLEMS AND 
PROSPECTS 
In trying to restate the results of the ´tour d´horizon´ which was undertaken in this paper 
in order to map the crucial problems of how to conceptualize a ´global legal order´, one 
is thrown back to some basic form of epistemic scepticism. At least one observation is 
beyond doubt: The concept of a ´global legal order´ is not an innocent description of a 
body of rules that organizes the ´international community´, but is in itself a prescriptive, 
and to a certain degree conflictive, constructivist project.108 We – the international law-
yers – would like to construct such an order and tend to inscribe most of our wishes and 
normative aspirations in such a project. ´Real existing´ international law, however, is a 
very provisional and fragmentary body of legal rules and standards that have evolved 
from the manifold interactions of a fragmented global society – a society that comprises 
the traditional ´society of states´, but also a wider array of societal networks that link up 
firms and civil society actors at regional as well as global level. The body of rules orga-
nizing this ´anachical society´ is far from being consistent, does not embody a plausible 
idea of justice and bears some rather disquieting features. One of these features is the 
fragmented nature of the substance of international law, of the body of legal rules, but 
also of the institutional structure characterizing the ´global legal order´. Such institu-
tional structure is marked by a strong degree of organizational fragmentation. The or-
ganizational backbone of ´global legal order´ is not a unitary structure of global gov-
ernment, but is an anarchical array of transgovernmental and transnational networks 
linking specialized bureaucracies and agencies, but also private business and civil soci-
ety actors throughout the world. As fragmented as the modern state is in its internal 
structure, with a plethora of more or less independently acting specialized state organs, 
administrations, agencies and semi-private satellites of the state, as fragmented is also 
the international system, with all these administrations and agencies reaching out trans-
nationally and coalescing with their counterparts in other states, but also with like-
minded corporate and civil society actors that help these networks of state actors to push 
through their issues.  
Such fragmentation leads to a certain amount of inconsistency in substance, but also 
to strong inequalities in the degree of ´legalization´ of international relations. In some 
                                                 
107  See also Twining (footn. 91), at Chapter 13. 
108  See only Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, andThird 
World Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 2003), at 22. 
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sectors ´legalization´ has progressed rather far, with strong institutions at international 
level; in other sectors coordination happens only through loose networks. Such an 
asymmetric state of ´legalization´ again might end up in frictions – there is a danger that 
strong legal regimes ´colonialize´ neighbouring fields where a strong normative consen-
sus has not been found until now. The described ´colonialization´ might subject certain 
areas to the systemic rationality of another field, thus disturbing its proper normative 
evolution. It is of extreme importance that legal doctrine develops a clear idea of such 
asymmetries (and the dangers inherent in it). Only when international lawyers in their 
positive legal work take cognizance of such asymmetries and develop a set of tools how 
to deal with them, international law can avoid the traps of ´legal imperialism´. The tradi-
tional understanding of international law as a unitary body of rules forming a consistent 
´legal order´ hinders the development of an adequate sensibility for the problems de-
scribed above under the headings of ´fragmentation´ and ´asymmetry´. Raising a certain 
degree of conscience for these issues was a primordial task of the paper – and for gain-
ing a clear picture of these phenaomena it is necessary to take recourse to bits and 
pieces of social science theory. 
Other dangers that call for attention in doctrinal legal work are inherent in current in-
ternational law as well. In normal cases, international law is applied in a loyal spirit by 
state actors because the ´internalized´ patterns of ´rule of law´ suggest that international 
legal obligations should be honoured. There are also reputational arguments that speak 
in favour of applying international legal rules automatically, without calculating in each 
case whether the relevant rule is really furthering state interests (if one can identify such 
collective interests so easily at all). But underneath complex international regimes, with 
its resultant legal obligations, there must exist as a fundament an arrangement of incen-
tives that induces states to take the obligations seriously, and deters them from defection 
into ´opportunistic´ behaviour. The construction of international regimes can influence 
such incentive structures, and can heighten the costs of defection considerably by trying 
to create as much transparency on compliance as possible, and by institutionalizing ade-
quate organs that monitor compliance, warn other members if states defect and thus put 
a certain pressure upon states to abide by the rules. Linking these mechanisms up to 
non-governmental actors, such as transnational enterprises and NGO´s, can put addi-
tional pressure on governments to comply with its undertakings under international law. 
A strong learning curve in engineering such mechanisms is observable when new inter-
national regimes are constructed or existing ones are reorganized. For developing a con-
structive perspective on the functions which such arrangements should fulfil, it is im-
portant to link up the debates in international alw and in private lawyers´ discourses on 
transnational law. Real life does not follow the artificial boundaries of academic disci-
plines – and the real-existing ´global legal order´ is a hybrid of international and trans-
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national arrangements that can only be understood adequately if perspectives of public 
and private law are brought together. 
Why is the issue of compliance so crucial for an understanding of the evolving 
´global legal order´?  ´Effectivity´ of legal regimes is vital for its legitimacy – and we 
must accordingly pay much more attention to issues of ´effectivity´ than traditional in-
ternational legal doctrine has done. Looking to ´effectivity´, however, requires empirical 
studies and a sound understanding of social science theories on international relations. 
But ´effectivity´ alone cannot always secure legitimacy. Another dimension of legiti-
macy is procedural fairness in the formation of such regimes – fairness that includes a 
serious level of participation in rule-formulation as well as the observance of certain 
basic procedural standards. A third dimension is the linkage to prevailing concepts of 
´justice´, the value-dimension of international law. Law must not always in a strict sense 
be an expression of ideas of ´justice´, but it must at least respect societal values (and 
should definitively not contradict such values). The current ´global legal order´ has a 
severe problem with this ´justice dimension´, because we still lack a consistent and uni-
form set of societal values all over the world. ´Universality´ of human rights, to take an 
example, still is more a normative claim than a societal reality. The ´universal´ value 
system expressed in international human rights treaties is a product of European legal 
evolution, spread over the world by the expansion of the European model of statehood. 
Practically no state can abstain from paying at least lip-service to such values, if it does 
not want to be qualified as a ´fragile´ or even ´failed´ state. But the retreat of the Euro-
pean state model in large parts of the South means that the façade of ´universal´ values 
is falling apart. The legitimacy of parts of international law, and with it international 
law as such, will become object of a more and more intense dispute. But international 
lawyers would betray their mission if they would retreat in the face of such resistance. 
Modern international law has always been a normative, if not to say prescriptive project, 
and not a simple description of social reality. Such normative project is even more des-
perately needed if mankind shall survive in the face of severe challenges like dramatic 
economic inequalities on a global scale, escalating violence, environmental catastrophes 
and rising tides of migration. Accordingly, we need a conceptualization of the project of 
the ´global legal order´ that reformulates the normative vision of international law while 
taking cognizance of all the empirical and theoretical intricacies and fallacies of such a 
normative project. The debate on how such a conceptualization might look like is still in 
an embryonic phase. A lot still needs to be done – in academic as well as in political 
terms.  
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